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El present article intenta redefinir la relació entre teoria i pràctica a partir de la concepció
de la investigació en l’acció. La investigació en l’acció (IA) no es troba només orientada
cap a la millora de la pràctica, de la mateixa manera que la investigació no es troba només
orientada cap a la producció del coneixement. El coneixement pràctic, que es deriva de la
investigació en l’acció, pot ser considerat com a teòric. En altres paraules, la narració de
la IA inclou l’activitat teòrica com un aspecte de la pràctica. La IA és percebuda com una
modalitat d’acció sistemàtica.
En els discursos postmoderns actuals, aquesta forma de concebre la investigació en
l’acció no pot ser exclosa del domini del coneixement públic. La IA engloba l’estudi dels pro-
fessors com a agents de canvi i la manera com les seves intencions afecten els canvis pot
realitzar-se a partir de recollir múltiples perspectives de la situació en qüestió. Aquestes
representacions poden ser usades també com a recursos per informar la seva comprensió
dels aspectes particulars de la situació que, com a agents, han de confrontar, conjuntament
amb els investigadors educatius. En síntesi, la IA resol el problema de la relació entre teo-
ria i pràctica, teoritzant des de la perspectiva que l’agent educatiu és un agent actiu de canvi
en les situacions educatives.
Paraules clau: investigació en l’acció, relació teoria i pràctica, coneixement pràctic, pro-
fessors, agent actiu de canvi.
Abstract
This paper attempts to redefine the relationship between theory and practice in terms of the
idea of action research. Action research is not only aimed at the improvement of practice,
and research is not only aimed at the production of knowledge; practical knowledge, which
stems from action research, can also be valued as theoretical. In other words, the account
of action research includes theoretical activity as an aspect of the practical.
Action research is viewed as a systematic form of action. In today’s postmodern dis-
courses, such understanding of action research can not be excluded from the domain of
public knowledge. Action research involves the study of teachers as agents of change and
the way their intentions to effect changes can be done by gathering multiple perspectives
on the situation in question. Such representations can be also used as resources to inform
their understanding of particular aspects of the situation they face as educational agents,
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Educar 34 001-176  7/1/05  13:06  Página 12together with educational researchers. In sum, action research resolves the theory-practice
problem by theorising from the standpoint of the educational agent as an active agent in
changing educational situations.
Key words: action research, theory-practice problem, practical knowledge, teachers, active
agent, changing educational situations. 
Resumen
El presente artículo trata de redefinir la relación entre teoría y práctica a partir de la con-
cepción de la investigación en la acción. La investigación en la acción (IA) no se halla sólo
orientada hacia la mejora de la práctica, del mismo modo que la investigación no se halla
sólo orientada a la producción del conocimiento. El conocimiento práctico, que se deriva
de la investigación en la acción, puede ser considerado como teórico. En otras palabras, la
narración de la IA incluye la actividad teórica como un aspecto de la práctica.
La IA es percibida como una modalidad de acción sistemática. En los discursos pos-
modernos actuales, esta forma de concebir la investigación en la acción no puede ser exclui-
da del dominio del conocimiento público. La IA engloba el estudio de los profesores como
agentes de cambio y el modo como sus intenciones afectan a los cambios puede realizarse
a partir de recoger múltiples perspectivas de la situación en cuestión. Tales representacio-
nes pueden ser usadas también como recursos para informar su comprensión de los aspec-
tos particulares de la situación que, como agentes, deben confrontar, conjuntamente con
los investigadores educativos. En síntesis, la IA resuelve el problema de la relación entre
teoría y práctica teorizando desde la perspectiva de que el agente educativo es un agente
activo de cambio en las situaciones educativas.
Palabras clave: investigación en la acción, relación teoría y práctica, conocimiento prácti-
co, profesores, agente activo de cambio. 
Action-research might be defined as «the Study of a social situa-
tion with a view to improving the quality of action within it». 
(Elliott 1991, p. 69)
This definition appeared in my book Action Research for Educational Change
(1991) and is widely cited in books and papers on action research. Rather than
feeling pleased about this, I find myself annoyed and irritated. Why? Because
I feel that the authors neglect my attempts to redefine the relationship between
theory and practice in terms of the idea of action research. At times they appear
to be using my definition to place a tight boundary between action research
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of theory. The drawing of such a tight boundary is often based on the assump-
tion that the practical knowledge which stems from action research is non-
theoretical in character because its value is entirely instrumental to the task of
improving practice as a means to an end. Such an assumption implies that the
pursuit of practical knowledge through action research is for the sake of prac-
tical goals that can be defined independently and in advance of the action
research process, whereas research aimed at the construction of theory is the
pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. Conceived in such instrumental terms,
practical knowledge has no value in itself, and is set against theoretical knowl-
edge regarded by those who pursue it as valuable in itself. My own work was
being selectively appropriated to legitimate a conception of action research
which privileged practice over theory, whereas I had seen it as an attempt to
redefine the relationship between theory and practice in a way which dissolved
the dualism.
In the late ‘90s, I directed a study of action research carried out in the con-
text of post-graduate courses for teachers within the UK, and discovered that
it was predominantly conceived inside academic institutions as the produc-
tion of instrumental knowledge aimed at underpinning improvements in prac-
tice in schools and other educational organisations (see Elliott, MacLure &
Sarland, 1996).
One obstacle to dissolving the dualism between theory and practice is the
idea of a ‘theory’ as a generalisable representation of events and occurrences.
From such a standpoint, theory generation implies a large-scale study of sam-
ples and the exclusion of small-scale studies of particular events and situations.
Hence my definition of action research as ‘the study of a social situation with
a view to improving the quality of action within it’ will be read as an account
of a form of small-scale research carried out in particular settings, such as a
single classroom or a school, with a view to generating a highly particularised
and therefore non-theoretical representation of action.
Earlier in my book Action Research for Educational Change, I am more
explicit about the relationship between the practical aim of action research
and the production of knowledge.
The fundamental aim of action research is to improve practice rather than to
produce knowledge. The production and utilisation of knowledge is subordi-
nate to, and conditioned by, this fundamental aim. (p. 49)
As I shall explain more fully later, I was trying to signify the primacy of the
practical standpoint as a context for knowledge generation. I was saying that
in the process of action research the intention to produce knowledge cannot be
separated from the intention to improve practice. However, I see now that my
words can be read as a privileging of practice over theory. Just as to privilege
theory over practice implies the exclusion of the practical standpoint, so to
privilege practice over theory excludes the theoretical standpoint.
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practice dualism by linking theory to practice. It simply excludes the theore-
tical standpoint. In doing so, it is shaped by the same assumptions which shape
forms of educational research that privilege theory over practice; namely, that
«theory» consists of generalisable representations of events, and is generated
by activities that in themselves are dissociated from the practical intentions of
human agents. In failing to challenge these assumptions, much of what counts
as action research in the field of education fails to dissolve the dualism between
theory and practice. It simply sets up a tension inside the academy with those
forms of educational research that privilege ‘theory’. Educational action research
is pitted against educational science, and as such confined to a lowly status in
the academic hierarchy of knowledge as a minor «sub-discipline» in the field
of educational research.
The shared assumptions outlined above positively shape the conduct of
educational science whereas they negatively shape the conduct of educational
action research. They effectively exclude action research from the domain of
public knowledge and confine it to the domain of private knowledge. In terms
of these assumptions, public knowledge is defined from a standpoint which
privileges theory over practices. From this standpoint, what counts as public
knowledge is determined by considerations concerning the validity and truth
of theoretical propositions rather than considerations concerning their prac-
tical usefulness. The latter may be important to address but they are extrinsic
to the activities of knowledge production. In the UK, educational researchers
are being asked to address the relevance of their research to potential users
before they design it, and to play a more active role in disseminating their find-
ings to the public. Although researchers may regard such considerations as
important they are viewed as quite distinct from methodological considera-
tions about the conduct of the research itself.
What counts as public knowledge generally determines what gets pub-
lished. Academics who wish to support action research with teachers and other
professional practitioners (eg nurses and social workers) tend in the main to
publish accounts of the research process and methodology. The knowledge
outcomes are often not deemed to be of sufficient status to report and find
acceptance in prestigious academic publications. Academic action researchers
tend to find themselves marginal players in the educational research estab-
lishment. Most of them go along with this. They compensate by identifying
with communities of practitioners and may acquire the status of ‘big fish’ in the
small action research pool inside the academy, but they leave the domain of
educational research essentially intact and unchallenged.
Currently the most influential challenge to this domain inside the acade-
my is stemming from the ideas of poststructuralist thinkers like Derrida, Lacan,
Lyotard and Foucault (see Belsey, 2002). From the perspective of poststruc-
turalist educational researchers, such as Stronach and MacLure (1997), inasmuch
as the idea of action research privileges practice over theory it is trapped in the
patterns of dualistic thinking that characterise the western tradition of enlight-
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MacLure (1995) has applied the poststructuralist methodology of «decon-
struction» to the texts created by action researchers in the field of education.
I will now examine the poststructuralist challenge to enlightenment thinking
with a view to asking what its implications are for the theory-practice prob-
lem and the idea of action research as a resolution of this problem.
The poststructuralist challenge and the theory-practice relationship
It is often assumed that theorising is a mental activity and action a physical
activity. In this mind-body dualism resides the problem of theory and prac-
tice. From a theoretical standpoint the «self» is a thinking subject that con-
strues the world as an object of contemplation rather than an object of change.
Descartes’ Cogito ergo sum (see 1968) established «the self» as a substance whose
essence is thinking and therefore the primacy of the theoretical over the prac-
tical standpoint. From the standpoint of the «Cogito», reasons for action have
their source outside the context of the practical affairs of everyday life in the con-
templative knowledge of the «thinking subject». Such knowledge can there-
fore be applied to practice but not derived from it. The «Cogito» has defined
the relationship between theory and practice in the western enlightenment
tradition and shaped the process of knowledge production within the acade-
my. In doing so it challenged traditional authority on matters of belief and
constituted a declaration of independence. As the Scottish philosopher John
Macmurray (1957, p. 75) explained, if to think is my essential nature then «I
have the right and the duty to think for myself, and to refuse to accept any
authority other than my own reason as a guarantor of truth.» This logic was rad-
ically challenged by Macmurray himself as well as by the poststructuralist and
postmodern thinkers on the European continent during the latter half of the
20th Century.
Poststructuralist thinkers elaborated on the work of Saussure (1916, trans
1974) and brought the idea of the substantial self whose essence is thinking
into question, and along with it the idea of reason as a guarantor of truth.
According to Saussure, ‘meanings’ such as theories about the world do not
originate from a «thinking self». The latter is a product of the meanings indi-
viduals learn from their culture, and that originate in its symbolic systems or
discourses. The words and other symbols that make up a language do not refer
to meanings that exist outside the language itself. They neither represent an
objective order of things in the world or the ideas of a thinker that exists inde-
pendently of their use within the culture. Meaning resides in the sign, not
beyond it. It is differential rather than referential (see Belsey, 2002, p. 10) in
the sense that it is culturally differentiated and has no existence beyond the
words and symbols that signify it.
Poststructuralist thought deconstructed a conception of theoretical knowl-
edge as the product of a thinking subject, construed as the «essential self», con-
templating independently existing objects in the external world. If the think-
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the symbolic systems of the culture, then it does not exist as an unconditioned
consciousness. The subject is decentered as the origin of thought. It thinks
only what it is permitted to think within the culture it is conditioned by. The
world it «knows» is therefore a culturally differentiated one rather than an
objective world that exists independently of the knower. One cannot even talk
intelligibly of the decentered subject possessing personal knowledge for this pre-
supposes a culturally unconditioned consciousness of «self». If the objects of
knowledge are culturally differentiated and the knower is the effect of culture,
then individuals are not in a position to construct purely personal knowledge.
What they believe is always what their culture permits. Poststructuralism,
through its method of deconstruction, dissolves the binary opposition enshrined
in Descartes’ Cogito between «the knowing subject in here and the objects of
its knowledge out there» (see Belsey, 2000, p. 72-73).
Foucault in particular pointed out the implications of this decentered vision
of the subject for the way power operates in society (see 1979a & 1979b).
Learning and maintaining the ways of thinking about the world differentiat-
ed by the culture, its theoretical and normative discourses, involves submis-
sion to the authorities responsible for their transmission and maintenance. For
Foucault all social relations connecting the individual to social institutions are
relations of power. Power is not a thing some individuals have and others do
not, that can be gained or lost. Rather it defines the relation between all indi-
viduals and their culture, including those authorities who are responsible for
the transmission and maintenance of that culture. The latter exert power in
their relations with others by virtue of their own compliance to the culturally
differentiated meanings circulating within the society. According to Foucault,
this relational conception of power implies the possibility of resistance. Indi-
viduals can always refuse to conform, although usually at a price, and create
reverse discourses to maintain their resistance to the dominant ones operating in
the society. Power relations are a site of struggle and conflict. One might indeed
interpret the action research movement in such Foucaultian terms as a reverse
discourse of resistance to the prevailing discourse of research in the academy;
namely one which privileges theoretical knowledge over practice.
From the poststructuralist perspective, «theories» are not a rational foun-
dation for ordering practical affairs. In learning to apply them to our prac-
tices, we are not grounding those practices in objective truths about the objects
of our experience, but securing their compliance with culturally differentiated
systems of meaning that tell us what to think about what we are doing. The-
oretical discourses, understood as systems of culturally differentiated mean-
ings circulating in society, constitute resources for exerting epistemic sover-
eignty over our practical thinking. The increasingly policy-driven
«evidence-based practice» movement in the UK (see Hargreaves, 1997) that
holds professional practitioners (eg doctors, nurses, social workers and teach-
ers) accountable for the extent to which they ground their practices in research
evidence, is an attempt by the state to get them to base their practical judge-
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are produced by research. From a poststructuralist point of view this move-
ment can be interpreted as an indirect and «soft» attempt to exert a form of
epistemic sovereignty over the practical thinking of practitioners in the guise
of fostering rational practices.
If, in applying theory to practice, social practitioners such as teachers are
managing their own compliance with culturally determined systems of mean-
ing, how are we to understand the practices shaped by this process? Descartes’
‘Cogito’ assumes a sharp division between mind and body. Whereas the think-
ing and reasoning mind is the essence of the self, the body is simply an organ-
ism it possesses (see Belsey, 2000, p. 66). When left to respond to its envi-
ronment on the basis of its own physiological make-up, the movements of the
body are entirely independent of the reasoning activities of the mind. How-
ever, the thinking and reasoning mind can exert a measure of control over the
physical movements of the body as a means of achieving practical ends that
transcend the survival needs of the organism. From the standpoint of the «Cog-
ito», the physical movements of the body (behaviour) are transformed into
the practices of a human agent (actions) by the capacity of the mind to impose
some form of rational order on them. The poststructuralist challenge to the
«Cogito» nullifies this account of social practices as the effect of rational human
agents on the movements of the body and construes social practices as reac-
tions on the part of the human organisms to stimuli in the cultural environment,
motivated by their survival needs. Such reactions will involve consciousness
but it will take a different form from consciousness conceived in terms of an
agent having reasons for action. As Macmurray (1957, p. 167) points out,
conscious reactions to environmental stimuli stem from motives connected to
the organisms survival needs, rather than reasons for action. The initiative for
such behaviour lies with the stimulus as opposed to a human agent, whereas the
initiative for action lies with an agent who determines it in the light of their
knowledge. From the perspective of poststructuralist theory, social practices
are conceived in terms of adaptive responses on the part of human organisms
to cultural stimuli rather than in terms of self-initiated actions. Viewed in such
terms, the activity of applying theory to practice depicts not so much the
process by which human agents rationally determine their actions in the world,
as the process by which human organisms consciously adapt their behaviour in
response to cultural stimuli.
The poststructuralist challenge, as I have argued, acknowledges the possi-
bility of resistance to the cultural conditioning it depicts. Human beings can
inhibit the tendency to adapt to their cultural environment in the required
ways but only at the risk of their survival. They can transgress and disrupt
hegemonic discourses and even establish reverse discourses. However, might
such resistances be simply interpreted as negative reactions to cultural stimuli
—failures on the part of certain human organisms to adapt appropriately to
the prevailing hegemonic discourses within the cultural environment— rather
than forming a basis for free action? I shall return to this question a little later.
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It is interesting to look at the view of social practice implicit in postmodern
deconstructions of the prevailing discourses in western societies in the light of
Hannah Arendt’s account of the The Human Condition (1958). As Canovan
(1974, p. 54) points out, Arendt focuses her philosophy on describing and
evaluating the various forms of human activity, rather than focusing, like most
western philosophers have done, on evaluating the products of human thought.
Human activity she claimed had not been sufficiently thought about and «its
modes not clearly articulated» (Canovan, p. 54). I would argue that such philo-
sophical neglect also extends to poststructuralist thinkers. Their deconstruc-
tions of western enlightenment thought appear to leave us with a view of social
practices as forms of cultural conditioning, but they are less than clear about
the extent to which alternative modes of activity are possible.
Arendt distinguishes three basic modes of human activity: Labour, Work
and Action. «Labour» is activity dictated by what is required to sustain life. It
is basically life lived under the domination of biological necessity, although
Arendt reluctantly acknowledges that in the modern world what is experienced
as necessary to sustain life has been extended to cover the consumption of
material goods that go beyond the basic necessities of living (see Coulter, 2002,
p. 195). Activities of labour involve endless repetition. They are not directed
to some end determined by an agent. They focus on means rather than ends.
If labour has an ‘end’ it is simply the perpetuation of life, the successful adap-
tation of human organisms to their environment, in an endless cycle. The
poststructuralist perspective on social practices in western societies appears to
render them predominantly activities of «Labour» in the Arendtian sense of
this term.
«Work», according to Arendt, involves the creation of enduring objects or
artefacts for use rather than consumption to satisfy basic needs (see Canovan,
1974, p. 56 & Coulter, 2002, p. 197). Unlike ‘Labour’ such activities have
a beginning and a finite ending consciously determined by the workers them-
selves. Moreover, workers deploy their particular talents and abilities to cre-
ate their «works». «Work», in the Arendtian sense of the term, calls forth the
generative capacities of human beings and, in doing so, as Canavan (1974,
p. 56) points out, «is characteristically human as labour is not». From an
Arendtian perspective theories or ideas can be regarded as the products of
human work. They form part of a cultural environment that human beings
create for themselves. Once created, cultural artefacts like theories and ideas
stand over and against human beings to define their world. Poststructuralist
theory only leaves space for conceiving culture as that which stands over and
against human beings. From this point of view «the self» is an effect rather
than an originator of culture. In destroying «the self» conceived as a think-
ing subject passively mirroring an objective world from a contemplative
standpoint, poststructuralist theory has difficulty in conceiving of any loca-
tion for ‘the self ’ other than as an effect of culture. By focusing on human
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to explore alternative locations for «the self» to those of the purely intellec-
tual standpoint and that of an organism reacting to an environment that is
set over and against it.
Arendt’s third mode of human activity is that of «action», a category she
deploys to vindicate her belief in human freedom (see Canovan, 1974, p. 58;
Coulter, 2002, p. 198-203). ‘Action’ involves initiating change in a social
situation to bring about something new in the web of social relationships that
constitute it. The consequences of «action» for the agent and those effected
by them, where they will lead, cannot be entirely foreseen in advance. «Action»
therefore becomes a matter of continuous negotiation with others through the
construction in process of ‘transient accounts’ as it unfolds in the process.
The full story of «action» can only be pieced together after the event.
Since for Arendt «action» is inextricably linked to communication with
others considered as equals, it occurs in public rather than private space, which
she regards as the realm of freedom. In this sense it is intrinsically «political»,
and is not to be confused with the political organisations human beings estab-
lish for the purpose of perpetuating their natural biological needs. The sphere
of «action» transcends the hierarchical or sovereign relation between governments
and their subjects (Canovan, 1974, p. 68).
In the activity of «labour», human beings are bound by biological neces-
sities and therefore do not engage in them freely. Even in the activity of «work»
their freedom is restricted by the object it aims to create. It is only in «action»
—an activity that changes a human situation by initiating something new—
that human beings experience unconstrained freedom. This is because in
«action», in exercising agency to effect change, human beings reveal their
unique individuality to themselves and others. This is not «a self» that they
are aware of prior to acting. Human beings learn who they are from their
‘actions’ in the human world (see Canovan, 1974, p. 59). From an Arendtian
perspective «the self» is located in its «actions» and the experience of agency
which accompanies them.
Since for Arendt «action» is always carried out in the company of others
conceived as free and equal individuals it possesses the twin qualities of plurality
and natality. In «action» the agent takes into account the unique points of view
that others hold towards the situation in question. This is not the same as act-
ing on the basis of a negotiated consensus. In «action» the agent reveals his or
her own distinctive view of the situation, but it is developed in communication
with others and accommodates or ‘invoices’ (my term) their own distinctive
outlooks. It is in this sense that Arendt regards ‘action’ as plural. The more an
agent accommodates the plural voices of others, the more his or her activity
constitutes «action». The concept of natality as a quality of action is used by
Arendt to contrast ‘action’ with mere role governed behaviour. In ‘action’ con-
ditions are created that enable the agent and others to reveal their individual-
ity and uniqueness by starting something new and, in doing so, to transcend
what is merely required of them in their roles in life. If «action» has an aim,
20 Educar 34, 2004 John Elliott
Educar 34 001-176  7/1/05  13:06  Página 20it is to enlarge the space in which human beings can relate to each other as
unique individuals in the situation. Such an aim is not the intention to produce
an outcome or result, but a value built into the process of action itself.
In articulating these distinctive modes of human activities Arendt perhaps
achieves what poststructuralist theory fails to; namely, an alternative social
location to the «Cogito» for the existence of «the self», other than as a mere
effect of culture. For Arendt «the self» only exists in ‘action’. However, one
might argue that the possibility of ‘action’ in her sense of the term is what Fou-
cault alludes to when he talks about resistance and the struggle of power, and
indeed what Derrida (1995) is attempting to articulate when exploring the
possibility of an ethics of deconstruction in his later work (see Belsey, 2002,
p. 90). The fact that we live in a culturally differentiated world does not exon-
erate us, Derrida argues, from the responsibility to acknowledge this in the
way we live. Such an acknowledgement may leave no certain foundations for
living, but it does leave what he calls ‘messianicity’, not the hope of realising
some utopean or fixed vision of the future but of a different future (see Belsey,
p. 91). Within such a postmodern ‘acknowledgement’ of the possibility of new
beginnings for human beings lies the «seeds» of an Arendtian view of «action»
and «the self» as agent.
I am struck by the parallels between Arendt’s account of action and my own
account of ‘educational action research’. Interestingly Coulter (2002, p. 189-206),
drawing on Arendt’s categories, finds few examples of «action» research reported
in his review of papers published in the Educational Action Research Journal
compared with «labour» and «work» research.
I have always stressed the importance of viewing «education» as an activi-
ty directed by process values rather than objectives which refer to extrinsic out-
comes of the activity. Also I have attempted to locate action research in the
context of teachers’ attempts to effect changes in the conditions governing life
in classrooms and schools for themselves and their students. Again, in research-
ing educational practice to effect change I have argued that teachers and their
collaborators should gather multiple perspectives on the situation in question
from their colleagues, students and even parents in the form of triangulation
data. Finally, the value Arendt places on «action» in particular human situa-
tions, as the context in which human beings realise their freedom and digni-
ty, makes her sceptical about the value of sociological theory couched in the
form of generalisable representations of events. She views such ‘representa-
tions’ as potential devices for social control and centralising power within the
state. I have argued, consistently with Arendt’s position, that action researchers
may use such ‘representations’ as resources to inform their understanding of
particular aspects of the situation they face as agents of change, but they should
not treat them as «law-like» generalisations which offer firm prescriptions for
what to do. They need to be integrated into a more personal holistic under-
standing of the situation forged by the agents of change themselves in the
course of ‘action’. We may refer to such understanding as a theory of the situa-
tion.
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ly hidden from the poststructuralist thinker’s gaze, that I shall now turn in the
next section. In doing so, I will draw heavily on John Macmurray’s ‘The Self
as Agent’ (1957). His standpoint on the location of ‘the self ’ in action is remark-
ably consistent with Arendt’s philosophy of action.
Theorising from the standpoint of action
In this section, I will argue that action research need not exclude the devel-
opment of a theoretical representation of action, albeit a highly particularised
one. One can provide a meaningful account of action research as a process of
theorising about a practical situation. This will involve challenging the assump-
tions that the term «theory» exclusively refers to generalisable representations
of events, which can only be produced under conditions that are dissociated
from the intentions of agents to effect change in practical situations. In chal-
lenging these assumptions, I hope to demonstrate that improving the quality
of action in such situations involves the development of theory. I have else-
where tended to use the term ‘situational understanding’ (see Elliott 1993) to
demarcate the theoretical outcomes of action research from theory construed
as generalisable representations of events and occurrences.
My account of action research includes rather than excludes theoretical
activity as an aspect of the practical. In doing so it dissolves the dualism between
theory and practice. Few have articulated the position I shall argue for better
than Macmurray. I will begin with the following extract from «The Self as
Agent»:
Action —involves knowledge as its negative aspect. The carrying out of a prac-
tical intention therefore involves a development of knowledge —or if you will,
a continuous modification in the representation of the Other— as its nega-
tive aspect. This indeed is the primary source of that knowledge which comes
unsought with the growth of experience. (p. 179)
Here the use of the term ‘negative’ to refer to an aspect of action should
not be construed as an undesirable characteristic to be excluded from action.
For Macmurray, «Practical activity includes theoretical activity, of necessity in
its constitution» (p. 180). The latter therefore is secondary to the primacy of
practical activity and derivative from it. It is in this sense that it constitutes
the negative aspect of action. This in no way implies that knowledge is sim-
ply instrumental to action that can be defined independently of it. Macmur-
ray defines «action» as «a unity of movement and knowledge» (p. 128). There-
fore, he argues, «Knowledge is that in my action which makes it an action and
not a blind activity» (p. 129).
Donald Schon’s idea of ‘reflection-in-action’ echoes Macmurray’s account
of knowledge in action, although his influential book ‘The Reflective Practi-
tioner’ (1983) makes no reference to Macmurray’s work. However, Macmur-
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not in itself add up to an account of action research. What is missing is any
reference to the intention to seek knowledge of a situation through systemat-
ic and self-conscious inquiry (which bears some resemblances to Schon’s idea
of «reflection-on-action»). Since this intention must be viewed as the negative
aspect of a broader practical intention to change a situation, it would imply
that the action undertaken to effect change was developed systematically and
self-consciously. Action research may be viewed as a systematic form of action in
which the theoretical intention to ‘modify the representation of the Other’,
to use Macmurray’s terms, arises as the negative aspect of a positive inten-
tion to systematically and self-consciously bring about some change in «the
Other», understood as a practical situation for an agent. From this perspec-
tive, it is inappropriate to treat educational action research as merely a minor
sub-discipline within a broader domain of educational research. It implies a
radical reconceptualisation of the domain itself.
Such a position would assert the primacy of the practical and embrace the
proposition «I act therefore I am». This implies, as Macmurray argues in «The Self
as Agent», that the self exists only as an agent in a practical situation, who acts with
the intention of changing it in some respect. Can we talk sensibly about theorising
from the standpoint of practice as opposed to the intellectual standpoint of the
«Cogito»? Like Macmurray (p. 85) I believe we can. Indeed the idea of action
research embraces this belief (see Elliott & Adelman, 1996).
To reflect about the world from the purely intellectual standpoint of the
‘Cogito’ excludes any reference to the self as an agent in action intent on chang-
ing the world, since this standpoint presumes that the self is the substance of
a mind that thinks about the world independently of any action to change it.
Macmurray succinctly summarises the ideal of this intellectual mode of reflec-
tion, one which still shapes our educational system in the west and what counts
as research in the academy.
—a pure activity of thought which is cool, passionless and completely disin-
terested, seeking truth for its own sake, with no eye to the practical advantage
for the seeker or for anyone else. (p. 192)
It is impossible for the knowledge produced by this type of reflection to
make any direct link with the experience of those who want to effect change
in the world. Any link to the action context must be indirectly determined by
agents. Macmurray (p. 192-193) argues that since the intellectual mode of
reflection suppresses any feelings the observer of a situation may have towards
it, and abstracts features in it which make no reference to the practical valua-
tions of participants as they seek to effect change in it, the knowledge pro-
duced can have no practical value in itself other than as a means to an end.
From the practical standpoint the knowledge yielded by the intellectual stand-
point can only have instrumental significance at best. It is always knowledge of
the World-as-means and takes the form of generalised representations of facts
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of continuance in experience» (p. 198). If Macmurray is correct, then we can-
not argue that the Knowledge generated from the intellectual standpoint in
the academy is useless knowledge if agents can find a use for it in deciding
on the means they will adopt to realise their intentions. However, if one accepts
the postmodern critique that the intellectual standpoint masks a will to power
and that the «knowledge» it produces invariably serves the interests of those
who wish to coerce and control the activities of others, then one might ques-
tion its usefulness to ethical agents like teachers who wish to effect change in
ways which respect the agency of their students. See for example my analysis
of the control values that shape much of what counts as «school effectiveness»
research (Elliott, 1996).
Macmurray contrasts the intellectual mode of reflection with the emo-
tional mode. In the latter mode, although reflection involves a suspension of
action it adopts the standpoint of the agent and proceeds «as though we were
in action» (p. 86). In emotional reflection, adopting the practical standpoint
does not exclude the theoretical. Since it is this mode of theoretical reflection
which lies at the heart of the action research process (see Dadds, 1995), let me
now summarise Macmurray’s account of it (p. 198-202).
1. When reflection proceeds as though we were in action it does not abstract
from the agent’s feelings about the situation. Action is motivated by a feel-
ing of dissatisfaction with a situation and terminated when the agent feels
satisfied that the situation has been improved. Reflection involves under-
standing what makes the situation an unsatisfactory one for the agent, dis-
criminating the possibilities of action in it, and selecting one of these pos-
sibilities for realisation in action. Valuation is integral to this mode of
reflection. There is a unity of understanding the situation and the valuation
of it (see also O’Hanlon, 2002). As Macmurray puts it, «The world is
known primarily as a system of possibilities of action» (p. 191). Valuation
and Knowledge are the positive and negative aspects of forming and sus-
taining an intention to change a situation from an unsatisfactory to a satis-
factory state. Without them action would be impossible, and in some situa-
tions they require a prolonged period when action is suspended for the
sake of reflection about the situation from the standpoint of the agent.
2. Emotional reflection seeks to determine a situation as an end in itself. In con-
structing a representation of a possibility for realisation in action, it express-
es a valuation of what is represented as something to be enjoyed for its own
sake and not for the sake of accomplishing some further objective. Such a
representation will constitute an image of a particular situation yet to be
realised. Emotional reflection therefore moves towards a greater particu-
larisation of the representation of the possibility of action (see, for examples
in the context of teacher-based action research, Elliott & MacDonald,
1975). This contrasts with the intellectual mode of reflection which seeks
generalisable representations of the events and occurrences it selects for
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structs knowledge aesthetically. Both are activities of knowing and forms of
research. Within the intellectual mode of reflection «theory» refers to gen-
eralisable representations of the world while within the emotional mode
it refers to a representation of a possibility for realisation in action within
a particular situation. However, this does not rule out the discernment of
similarities as well as differences through a comparison of cases. Such dis-
cernment will take the form of general insights into the problems of effect-
ing change in relation to a practice such as teaching. Action research does
not rule out the development of overlapping theories that yield shared
insights into the possibilities for action (see, for example, Ebbutt & Elliott,
1985).
Concluding remarks
Action research resolves the theory-practice problem by theorising from the
standpoint of the agent in a situation s(he) feels to be unsatisfactory. It need not
simply involve the agent who wants to effect the change. Educational researchers
in the academy can collaborate with an educational agent by adopting his/her
practical standpoint as though they were in the action context. Educational
action research need not be exclusively practitioner research. The fact that it is
so often construed as such by educational researchers, suggests that they are
viewing it as a low level, non-theoretical activity from an intellectual stand-
point.
As an emotional mode of systematic reflection, educational action research
constitutes an art rather than a science and constructs knowledge aesthetical-
ly in unity with the activity of valuation. However, this does not make it any
less theoretical.
So how can one explain the resistance in the academy to educational action
research? I can only conclude that it is a resistance to educational change effect-
ed by teachers. The widespread involvement of teachers as active agents in
changing educational situations would reduce the power exerted by academ-
ic researchers —perhaps on behalf of the centralising power of the state— over
what is to count as knowledge about their practice. This because theoretical
knowledge from the standpoint of educational action is meaningless and val-
ueless if it cannot be validated in action as knowledge of the aims of educa-
tion, conceived as possibilities for action in a particular situation.
In discussing Arendt’s distinction between «Action» and «Making», Joseph
Dunne (1993, p. 89-90) highlights her concern about the extent to which the
products of ‘making’ in the sphere of science and technology were increasing-
ly deployed as standards of technocratic efficiency to shape human behaviour.
Through her eyes, he points out, the passive adaptation of citizens to the
products of science and technology leads to an increasing intolerance of «action».
This, in my experience, is precisely what is happening with respect to the teach-
ing profession. Governments hold teachers and other public service profes-
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dards» with «value-for-money». It is the task of educational researchers to
«make» knowledge, in the form of «generalisable representations» that can be
deployed as means-ends rules, to maximise the performativity of teachers in
delivering «value-for-money». In embracing this task, with national research
assessment exercises providing incentives for doing so, mainstream educational
researchers will tend to be intolerant of too much «action» in teaching, and of
a form of research which supports it. In this context, action-research consti-
tutes a reverse discourse that offers teachers an alternative future.
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